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I. INTRODUCTION

Since the United States Supreme Court first implied a private
right of action from a federal regulatory statute in Texas & Pacific
Railway v. Rigsby,1 federal courts have been attempting to
establish a consistent test for determining when such a private right
should be inferred. In Lamb v. Phillip Morris, Inc.,2 the Sixth
Circuit became the first federal appellate court to consider whether
a private right of action exists under the Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act (FCPA).3 The court in Lamb decided that no such action
exists. 4 This note contends that the Sixth Circuit has handed down
an erroneous decision, and that the language and history of the
FCPA indicates that a private right of action should be recognized.
The FCPA was enacted in 1977 as part of the Securities
Exchange Act primarily in response to the increasing use by
American firms of bribery to foreign officials in order to secure
new business or maintain a competitive advantage with respect to
existing business.5 Although enacted in 1977, the conceptual
beginnings of the FCPA occurred in the aftermath of Watergate.'
The Special Prosecutor for the Watergate Investigation had been
exploring illegal campaign contributions by American
corporations,7 and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
became interested in his investigation.8 The SEC discovered that
many of the illegal contributions were made through slush funds,

1.
2.
3.

241 U.S. 33 (1916), overruled by Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
915 F.2d 1024 (6th Cir. 1990), cert denied, 111 S. Ct. 961 (1991).
Pub. L. No. 95-213, tit. 1,91 Stat. 1494 (1977) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd to -2, 78m

(1988)).
4. Lamb v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 915 F.2d 1024, 1028 (1990), cert. denied, 11l S. Ct. 961.
In Lamb, the court recognized that private action under the FCPA had previously been rejected based
on the Act of State doctrine in Clayco Petroleum Corp. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 712 F.2d 404
(9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied,464 U.S. 1040 (1984), but pointed out that decision offered no guidance
to the present decision. Id. at 1027 n.9.
5.
Mary Siegel, The ImplicationDoctrine andthe ForeignCorruptPracticesAct,79 CoLUM.
L. Rav. 1085, 1085 (1979); see id at 1085 n.2.
6. Wallace Timmeny, An Overview of the FCPA, 9 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 235, 235
(1982).
7.
ForeignandCorruptBribes: HearingsBefore the Comm. on Banking, Housingand Urban
Affairs on S. 3133, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1976).
8.
See Tiunmeny, supra note 6, at 235.

534

1992 / Lamb v. Phillip Morris, Inc.
which consisted of money laundered through foreign agents.' The
SEC also discovered that much of the money stayed in the hands
of the foreign agents.1" These payments enabled the American
companies to obtain new business or continue established business
relationships. 1 More than 400 companies admitted to making
illegal or questionably illegal payments in excess of $300 million
during the 1960s and 1970s." In particular, from 1961 to 1975,
Lockheed Aircraft Corporation made payments in excess of $30
million to foreign officials in connection with sales of Lockheed
aircraft and equipment.13 Such payments have also been known
to
14
attest.
can
sovereigns
former
several
as
topple governments,
To combat this bribery and establish an even playing field for
American business, Congress enacted the FCPA in 1977. The
FCPA provides for both civil and criminal penalties. Because the
payments were often made to these officials through fictitious
entries in company books, 5 it also includes accounting provisions
to make detection possible. 6 The agencies responsible for
enforcement of the FCPA are the SEC and the United States
Attorney General. While the FCPA does not contain express
provision either allowing or prohibiting private rights of action, the

9.
Id.
10. Id; Frederick B. Wade, An Examination of the Provisions and Standards of the FCPA,
9 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L & COM. 255, 255-56 (1982).
11. See Siegel, supra note 5, at 1085.
12. See Wade, supra note 10, at 255-56 (citing H.R. REP. No. 831, 95th Cong., 1st Sess.
1977).
13. Gaines v. Haughton, 645 F.2d 761, 765 (9th Cir. 1981).
14. See Harvey L Pitt & Karl A. Groskaufmanis, Minimizing CorporateCivil and Criminal
Liability: A Second Look at Corporate Codes of Conduct, 78 GEo. LJ. 1559, 1583 n.145 (1990)
(citing John C. Coffee, Jr., Beyond the Shut-Eyed Sentry: Toward a Theoretical View of Corporate
Misconduct and an Effective LegalResponse, 63 U. VA. L REV. 1099, 1103 n.7 (1977)). Corporate
bribery by Lockheed Corp., Gulf Oil, and United Brands is reputed to have caused the downfalls of
the Tanaka government in Japan, General Rene Barrientos in Bolivia, and President Arellano in
Honduras, respectively. Id.
15.

Siegel, supra note 5, at 1085.

16. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 to -2 (setting forth the penalties for violation of the FCPA); see
also § 78m (requiring disclosure to the SEC of corporate records).
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history and purposes of the Act indicate that whether such a right
exists by implication is at least a debatable issue. 7
The implication doctrine allows the judiciary to infer the
existence of a private right of action within a federal statute where
none expressly exists. The implication doctrine was proposed by
the Court in Rigsby as a method of ensuring the accomplishment
of congressional goals in enacting legislation."8 Consequently, the
implication doctrine will be applied by the courts when there is a
danger that the congressional goals behind a specific statute will be
frustrated in the absence of a private right of action. Statutory law
is only as effective as its enforcement provisions, and the
advantage of judicial hindsight 9 makes the courts better situated
than the legislature to determine the actual effectiveness of those
provisions.2"
Part II of this note discusses the legislative history of the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, and the development of the
implication doctrine. Part II is an analysis of the Sixth Circuit's
decision as handed down in Lamb v. Phillip Morris, Inc. Part IV
applies the implication test as it stands today to the facts of Lamb
to determine whether the Sixth Circuit correctly applied the facts.
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND

A. The Foreign Corrupt PracticesAct
Although the FCPA was enacted in 1977 by the ninety-fifth
Congress, it was preceded by a substantial number of similar bills
offered in the preceding congressional session; all directed at
prohibiting corporate bribery. The most noteworthy bill to be
introduced during the ninety-fourth Congress was Senate Bill 3379,

17. Veronica Ann DeBerardine, ForeignCorruptPractices:Creatingan Exception to the Act
of State Doctrine,34 AM. U. L Rnv. 203, 226 n.155 (1984).
18. Steven L Nelson, Implication of PrivateActions From FederalStatutes: From Borak to
Ash, I J. CORP. L 371, 373-74 (1976).
19. Comment, Private Rights of Action Under Amtrak and Ash: Some Implications for
Implication, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 1392, 1393 (1975).
20. Id.
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which was introduced by Senator Frank Church.2" As originally
written, the bill included two provisions for the protection of
private plaintiffs injured by bribery.' According to Senator
Church, such private action would "allow the private sector to
police itself."' During Senate committee hearings on Senate Bill
3379, the SEC submitted a report which posited that private actions
should be eliminated from the language of the statute because such
a provision under one Securities Exchange Act (SEA) statute (in
this case, the FCPA) would create a negative inference with respect
to all other SEA statutes.24 The SEC, which was (and continues
to be) understaffed,' depends on private assistance when
enforcing certain provisions of the SEA. 26 As such, federal courts
had implied private rights of action within many SEA statutes. 27
Although the Committee "found merit" in the section of the bill
giving private redress to competitors harmed by bribery, it was
forced into deleting this provision because it would "create
ambiguities. ' 28 While Senate Bill 3379 passed the Senate without
express provision for private rights of action, the rules of statutory
interpretation would probably have permitted one to be implied.29
The following year, in the ninety-fifth Congress, another series
of antibribery legislation bills were proposed, and it was a

21. See Siegel, supra note 5, at 1105 (citing S. REP. No. 1031, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976)).
22. See id.(citing S. REP. No. 1031, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 12-13 (1976).
23. See Siegel, supra note 5, at 1106 (citing 122 CONG. REc. 12,605 (1976)).
24. See [1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L REP. 81,701, reprintingLetter from Frederick
B. Wade, Special Counsel to the SEC, to Mr. Raymond Garcia, Emergency Committee for American
Trade (May 16, 1978) [hereinafter Wade Letter] (citing Securities and Exchange Commission, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess., Report to the Senate Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs Committee on S.3379
(1976)). The SEC's report stated that a provision creating a private right of action would "create
confusion over whether Congress, by expressly recognizing one type of action, intended to preclude
the possibility of other implied causes of action." Id at 16.
25. See Nelson, supra note 18, at 371 n.6.
Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426,432 (1964)). In Borak, the SEC stated
26. See id. (citing J.1.
that due to staff limitations, the Commission could not adequately examine all of its cases. Id.
27. See infra note 182 and accompanying text (listing case in which the courts have implied
private rights of action under SEA statutes).
28. See Wade Letter, supra note 24, (citing S. REP. No. 1031, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 3, 13
(1976).
29. See infra notes 165-76 and accompanying text (providing an analysis of the statutory
interpretation of the FCPA).
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combination of Senate Bill 30530 and House Bill 381531 which
eventually became the FCPA. The legislative histories of Senate
Bill 305 and House Bill 3815 are replete with discussions of
private rights of action.32
33
House Bill 3815 included no express private right of action,
but the testimony before the House Subcommittee on Consumer
Protection and Finance and the remarks made by its members were
somewhat telling in this area. A House Report on House Bill 3815,
written after the Subcommittee hearings, stated the Subcommittee's
intention that private rights of action be recognized under the
FCPA for persons who suffer injury as a result of violations of the
Act, just as private actions are recognized under other SEA
legislation.' In addition, the City of New York Bar Association
submitted a report to the Subcommittee which stated their view that
the legislation would be available "to private plaintiffs in implicit
35
actions."
During the hearings by the same Subcommittee on Senate Bill
305, SEC Chairman Harold M. Williams testified that the
legislation would provide "the Commission and private plaintiffs
*.

.

with potent new tools to employ against those who [conceal

corporate bribery].", 36 At this time, the SEC indicated that a
private right of action could be inferred from the antibribery
provisions of the FCPA.37 In addition, a Senate Report
demonstrated the attitude of Senate members that the bribery used
by American corporations abroad was an unacceptable substitute

30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
(1977)).
35.

95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
Siegel, supra note 5, at 1111; See infra notes 160-69 and accompanying text.
Siegel, supra note 5,at 1109.
See Wade Letter, supra note 24 (citing H.R. REP. No. 640, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 10
Unlawful CorporatePayments Act of 1977: HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on Consumer

Protectionand Financeofthe House Comm. on Interstateand ForeignCommerce, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess. 88-90 (1977); cited in Siegel, supra note 5, at 1109.
36. Siegel, supra note 5, at 1109 n.171 (emphasis added) (quoting Unlawful Corporate
Payments Act of 1977: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Consumer Protectionand Financeof the
House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 198 (1977)).
37. See Siegel, supra note5, at 1088 n.17 (citing Securities Exchange Act Release No. 14,478,
43 Fed. Reg. 7752 (1978)).
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for straightforward, healthy competition in attracting foreign
business and had a negative impact on the domestic competitive
climate.38
B. The Implication Doctrine
1. Early History
Although the implication doctrine has been recognized in
England for almost 140 years,39 the U.S. Supreme Court did not
utilize the doctrine until 1916, when it decided Texas & Pacific
Railway v. Rigsby.' Rigsby was a railroad employee injured on
the job as a result of his employer's failure to comply with the
Federal Safety Appliance Act (FSAA). 4 1 Although the FSAA was
considered a penal statute, and therefore primarily enforceable by
the state, the Court implied a private right of action in favor of
Rigsby against his employer.42 The Court held that when a
defendant disregards a statute to the detriment of one of a class of
especial beneficiaries 43 thereof, the right to private remedies is to
be implied." At the time of Rigsby, as now, there were inherent
congressional limitations in enacting legislation.4" The purpose of
the implication doctrine is to prevent these limitations from
resulting in legislation which falls short of congressional goals.46
Perhaps the most significant limitation is a lack of congressional

38. See Wade Letter, supra note 24 (citing S. REP. No. 114, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1977)).
39. Couch v. Steel, 118 Eng. Rep. 1193, 1196-97 (Q.B. 1854).
40. 241 U.S. 33 (1916).
41. Id. at 36 (citing Act of Mar. 2, 1893, ch. 196, 27 Stat. 531 (1893) (amended 1910)).
42. Id. at 39-40.
43. Id. According to Rigsby, an especial beneficiary is a person for whom the statute was
enacted to benefit, or was enacted to create an advantage. Id. at 39.
44. Id. at 39-40.
45. See Nelson, supra note 18, at 373 (citing Fagot v. Flintkote Co., 305 F. Supp. 407,410
(E.D. La. 1969)); Paul L Mishkin, The Variousness of "FederalLaw" Competence and Discretion
in the Choice of National andState Rules for Decision, 105 U. PA. L REV. 797, 800 (1957); Note,
Implying Civil Remedies From Federal Regulatory Statutes, 77 HAv. L Rev. 285, 291 (1963);
Comment, supra note 20, at 1393.
46. See McDaniel v. Univ. of Chicago, 548 F.2d 689, 694 (7th Cir. 1977) (stating that the
Davis-Bacon Act, 40 U.S.C. §§ 276 to a-5, was a good example of how legislative remedies can be
ineffective in achieving the congressional purpose).
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foresight in recognizing the remedies necessary for effective
implementation.' 7 Legislators certainly know how to include a
private right of action within a statute, but they may not realize that
one is necessary, or they may simply neglect to include such a
provision. The courts, on the other hand, have the opportunity to
observe the actual effectiveness of the enforcement scheme, and
determine if private enforcement will be necessary to give effect to
congressional goals.48

2. The Implication Doctrine in the 1960s and 1970s
In the 1960s and early 1970s, federal courts frequently utilized
the implication doctrine to create remedies for private plaintiffs
under regulatory statutes. 9 In J.L Case Co. v. Borak, ° the

Supreme Court stated that it was the duty of the courts to provide
any necessary remedies to effectuate the congressional purpose.51
The Court then held that implying private rights of action, when
necessary, was one of these remedies.52 During the 1960s and
1970s, the courts applied a fairly simple implication analysis; if a
statute was enacted for the benefit of a special class, the judiciary
would recognize a personal remedy for members of that class.53
3. Cort v. Ash and the Cort Factors
In the 1975 landmark case of Cort v. Ash,5 4 the Supreme
Court created a new test for determining whether a private right of
action should be implied under a statute containing no express

47. See Nelson, supra note 18, at 374 (citing Mishkin, supra note 44, at 800); see also supra
notes 19-20 and accompanying text.
48. See Nelson, supra note 18, at 374.
49. See, e.g., Allen v. State Board of Elections, 393 U.S. 544 (1969), overruled by Touche
Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979); Wyandotte Transp. Co. v. United States, 389 U.S.
191 (1967); J.I Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964); Fagot v. Flintkot Co., 305 F. Supp. 407
(E.D. La. 1969).
50. 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
51. Id. at 433.
52. Id.
53. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 374 (1982).
54. 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
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private remedies. The new test was more specific than the test
previously applied, but it still allowed for a flexible approach.55
The four factors laid out in Cort to consider whether to imply a
private right of action are: (1) whether the plaintiff is one of the
class for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted, (2)
whether there is any explicit or implicit legislative intent which
shows an intent to either grant or deny a remedy, (3) whether
implication is consistent with the underlying legislative scheme,
and (4) whether the right of action is one traditionally left to the
56
states.
In Cort, the Supreme Court applied these factors and
determined that no private right of action existed under section 610
of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA).57 In Cort,
a shareholder of Bethlehem Steel was attempting to recoup the
corporation's campaign contributions during the 1972 presidential
election. 58 Applying the first factor, the Court focused on the fact
that the FECA was exclusively a criminal statute, and had no
provision for civil enforcement, either by private individuals or
government entities.59 The unanimous Court held that provision
for a criminal penalty did not preclude implication of a private
right of action, but concluded that there must be an indication that
some civil action was available? ° In discussing the second factor,
the Court determined that protection of shareholders was only a
secondary purpose of Congress in enacting the FECA.6" The Court
cited Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents62 as
precedent for the general rule that implied actions would be found
only where Congress had clearly articulated a right in favor of the
plaintiff. 63 In addition, the Court did not find in the legislative

55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
would in
61.
62.
63.

Jacobs v. Pabst Brewing Co., 549 F. Supp. 1050, 1056 (D. Del. 1982).
Cort, 422 U.S. at 78.
Id. at 84.
Id. at 70-71.
Id. at 74.
Id. at 79; see id. at 80 (The Court was unwilling to hold that even a bare criminal statute
every circumstance bar implication of a private right of action).
Id. at 81.
403 U.S. 388 (1971).
Cort, 422 U.S. at 82.
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history of the FECA any indication of congressional intent to create
a private remedy." For the third factor, while the Court did not
explicitly find that a private action was inconsistent with the
provisions of the FECA, they stated that private enforcement was
not necessary to effectuate the congressional purposes. 5 With
respect to the final factor, the Court pointed out that actions such
as this were generally brought as ultra vires or a breach of
fiduciary duty, both of which are generally subject to state
regulation." As such, the fourth factor was also not met under the
FECA.67
4. The Implication Doctrine After Cort v. Ash
In the years following Cort v. Ash, the Supreme Court refined
the test it had created in Cort. In 1979, the Supreme Court began
to establish a narrower standard for implying private actions from
federal statutes, holding in Cannon v. University of Chicago68 that
legislative intent essentially subsumed the other Cort factors. 9
Although the Court was willing to imply a private action under
Title IX of the Civil Rights Act, it did not believe that merely
violating a federal statute-harming some person in the
process-entitles the injured person to a private remedy.70
A second case, decided in 1979, continued to restrict the focus
of the Cort test to discerning legislative intent. In Touche Ross &
Co. v. Redington [hereinafter Touche Ross],7 1 the Court decided
that although all four of the Cort factors were to be considered, the
courts were not to accord equal weight to each factor.72 In Touche
Ross, the Court was debating whether to imply a private remedy

64. Id.
65. Id. at 84.
66. Id. at 84-85.
67. Id.
68. 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
69. Id. at 688-709. Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 578 (1979); Jacobs v.
Pabst Brewing Co., 549 F. Supp. 1050, 1056 (D. Del. 1982).
70. Cannon, 441 U.S. at 688.
71. 442 U.S. 560 (1979).
72. Id. at 575.

1992 / Lamb v. Phillip Morris, Inc.
under section 17(a) of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act.73 The
central inquiry was whether Congress intended, by express
language or by implication, to create a private right of action.74
Touche Ross viewed the other three Cort factors as simply subfactors which were traditionally used to determine legislative
intent.75 Because the Act's legislative history was completely
devoid of consideration as to the existence of a private right of
action, the Court refused to recognize one.76
Cannon not only narrowed the scope of the implication analysis
to a determination of legislative intent, it analyzed the legislative
intent for the first time within the contemporary legal context.77
Through this concept, the Court held that when conducting an
analysis of legislative intent, Congress is assumed to be cognizant
of "relevant judicial opinions when it enacts legislation. 78 In
Cannon, the Court held that Congress, in enacting Title IX of the
Civil Rights Act, was presumed to have been aware of then recent
decisions providing implied private rights of action under similarly
constructed Civil Rights legislation. 9
80
In Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran,
the Court continued to adhere to Cannon's concept of
contemporary legal context, stating that the focus of the legislative
intent determination must be on the state of the law at the time the
legislation was enacted."1 To make this determination, Curran
stated that the judiciary must scrutinize congressional perception of
the statute which it was enacting or amending. 2 The Court was
willing to imply a private right of action under the Commodity

73. Id. at 571-74.
74. Id. at 575.
75. Id. at 575-76.
76. Id. at 571-74.
77. Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 698-99 (1979).
78. Id.
79. See id. at 698 n.22 (citing Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, 396 U.S. 229 (1969), and Jones
v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1967), as cases in which similarly constructed Civil Rights
legislation was construed by the Supreme Court to include private rights of action).
80. 456 U.S. 353 (1982).
81. Id. at 378-79.
82. Id.
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Futures Trading Act (CFmA) of 1974,3 based on the conclusion
that prior to the 1974 amendments to the Act, federal courts had
already implied private rights of action." In the opinion of the
Court, the previously implied actions were a part of the
contemporary legal context at the time the Congress debated the
CFTA. Therefore, the Court held that it was the intent of Congress
to preserve the private remedy.8
III. THE CASE
A. The Facts
Plaintiffs were all Kentucky growers of burley tobacco, which
is used in cigarettes and other tobacco products.86 Defendants,
Phillip Morris and B.A.T. Industries, were tobacco purchasers
which regularly bought their tobacco in Kentucky, as well as in
foreign markets. 7 Because of the dual markets from which the
defendants were able to draw, Kentucky tobacco growers are in
direct competition with tobacco growers from abroad.88 In 1982,
a Phillip Morris subsidiary (called C.A. Tabacalera National) and
a B.A.T. subsidiary (called C.A. Cigarerra Bigott) entered into a
contract with La Fundacion Del Nino (Children's Foundation) of
Caracas, Venezuela.89 The Children's Foundation was represented
in the contract by the wife of the-then president of Venezuela.9"
The agreement called for periodic donations to the Children's
Foundation by the tobacco companies which would total
approximately $12.5 million. 91 In return, the Venezuelan
government would maintain price controls on Venezuelan tobacco,
eliminate controls on retail cigarette prices in Venezuela, grant tax

83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

544

7 U.S.C. §§ 821-822 (1988).
Curran, 456 U.S. at 381-82.
Id.
Lamb, 915 F.2d at 1025.
Id.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Lamb, 915 F.2d at 1025.
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deductions for the donations, and assure that existing tax rates
applicable to tobacco companies would not be increased.'
Plaintiffs also alleged that the subsidiaries of defendants had made
similar arrangements in Argentina, Brazil, Costa Rica, Mexico, and
Nicaragua.93
B. ProceduralHistory
Plaintiffs brought this action in the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Kentucky.' The complaint originally
claimed only an antitrust violation, but the plaintiffs were allowed
to amend their complaint to include a claim under the FCPA.95
According to plaintiffs, the donations paid by defendants'
subsidiary companies constituted unlawful inducements amounting
to bribery, and had the effect of restraining trade. 96 Plaintiffs
charged that the inducements artificially depressed tobacco prices,
especially in the United States.' In the meantime, according to
plaintiffs, producers of tobacco products were assured lucrative
prices in South American markets. 98 Plaintiffs requested treble
damages and injunctive relief based on the asserted reduction in
domestic tobacco prices. 99
The district court dismissed both of the plaintiffs' claims in
response to defendants' Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)
motion." ° The court held that the antitrust claim was barred by
the Act of State Doctrine, 1 ' and that the FCPA claim was an
impermissible private action."° Plaintiffs appealed to the Sixth

92.
93.
94.

Id.
Id.

95.
96.
97.

Id.
Lamb, 915 F.2d at 1025.
Id.
Id.

98.
99.
100.
101.
the courts
sovereign
102.

Id.

aIL
Id.
As described in Lamb, the Act of State doctrine "in its traditional formulation precludes
of this country from inquiring into the validity of the public acts a recognized foreign
power committed within its own territory." 915 F.2d at 1026.
Id at 1025.
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that the district court erroneously dismissed
Circuit, contending
10 3
their claims.

C. The Opinion
In Lamb, the Sixth Circuit was faced with a case of first
impression. No other federal appellate court had considered
whether there was an implied private right of action within the
FCPA. °4 Judge Guy, writing for the court, began his analysis by
setting out the four factors enumerated in Cort v. Ash.' 0 5 The
court pointed out that the implication analysis should focus on the
intent of Congress in enacting the legislation, 10 6 citing the
Supreme Court decision in Thompson v. Thompson'0 7 as support
for this position."10 Although Lamb realized that congressional
intent was the main issue, it utilized all four Cort factors in its
analysis, and actually gave the most attention to the especial
beneficiary consideration."
The court felt that the plaintiffs were not one of the especial
beneficiaries which Congress intended to protect in enacting the
FCPA.1 0 According to Judge Guy, the goal of the FCPA was to
promote confidence in international and domestic markets.' In
the opinion of the court, the Attorney General's role in encouraging
and supervising compliance with the Act indicated that the FCPA
was enacted to maintain the integrity of American foreign policy
and domestic markets, rather than to prevent the use of foreign
resources to reduce production costs.' From this finding, the

103. Id.
104. Id. at 1027.
105. See supra text accompanying note 56 (listing the Cort factors).
106. Lamb, 915 F.2d at 1028.
107. 484 U.S. 174 (1988).
108. Lamb, 915 F.2d at 1028; see Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 179 (1988) (The
intent of Congress is the ultimate issue for decision in an implication analysis, unless the statute has
express provision).
109. Lamb, 915 F.2d at 1028-30.
110. Id. at 1028-29.
111. Id.
112.
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court concluded that the plaintiffs, as competitors of the foreign
growers and suppliers of defendant purchasers, could not claim
intended beneficiary status under the FCPA. 1 s
Lamb next discussed whether the intent of Congress in enacting
the FCPA included recognition of private rights of action."' The
court focused on the ninety-fourth Senate's original inclusion of
express private rights of action under the FCPA, and subsequent
removal of this provision."n While the court recognized an
earlier House Committee Report which demonstrated a
congressional expectation that courts should infer a private right,
the court felt that the later conference report, which made no
mention of private actions, indicated the true intent of Congress
that no such right should exist." 6 Judge Guy indicated that, in his
personal opinion, the courts should never infer a private right of
17
action. 1
The court only briefly discussed the third and fourth Cort
factors. As to whether implication was consistent with the
underlying legislative scheme, the court found that private
enforcement would be inconsistent with the goals of the FCPA
since enforcement, according to the court, was to be carried out by
the Attorney General alone.' With respect to the fourth factor,
while the court did not find that this overseas bribery was an area
relegated to state control, it did conclude that the plaintiffs were
amply protected by federal antitrust laws." 9 Therefore, the court
was unwilling to use the fourth Cort factor to infer a private
1 20
right.

113. Lamb, 915 F.2d at 1028-29.
114. Id. at 1029.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 1029 n.13. "Speakdng only for myself, if writing on a clean slate, I would never
infer a private right of action where the legislation itself is silent in that regard." Id.
118. Lamb, 915 F.2d at 1029-30.
119. Id. at 1030.
120. Id.
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IV. ANALYSIS
In recent years, federal courts have been less likely to permit
a private recovery under a regulatory statute where such recovery
was not expressly provided."' The most commonly accepted
reason behind this policy has been that if the legislature intends for
a private right of action to exist, they know very well how to
include such a provision." But is this a good argument? After
all, the same reasons for implication that existed when the Supreme
Court decided Texas & Pacific Railway v. Rigsby are still in
existence today."2 The main purpose behind the implication
doctrine is to give full effect to the intent of the legislature.' As
mentioned earlier, there are inherent limitations in the legislative
process,"z most importantly congressional foresight. 126 In
today's complicated economic and legal spheres, the hindsight
gained by implication makes more sense than ever. 7
When undertaking an implication analysis, a court must focus
not only on the black letter law as set forth in the Cort v. Ash line
of cases, but also on the purposes of the implication doctrine itself.
As stated earlier in this text, the Cort factors are still applied, but
the main focus of the test is legislative intent, 28 which must be

121. This modem trend is apparent from the progression of Supreme Court cases beginning
with Texas & PacificRailway Co. v. Rigsby and J.L. Case v. Borak, in which the Court implied rights
of action whenever the statute in question appeared to fall short of attaining congressional goals. The
next major case was Cortv. Ash, in which the Court narrowed the test to the four step analysis. Then
in Cannon v. University ofChicago and MerrillLynch, Pierce,Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran,the
Court narrowed the test further essentially to determining whether there is discernible legislative

intent that a private right of action exists in the complaining plaintiff. See Jacobs,549 F. Supp. at
1058.
122. Lamb, 915 F.2d at 1029 n.13. The position of Judge Guy is indicative of the current
judicial attitude when he states that if the judiciary stopped filling in legislative gaps, Congress would
soon stop leaving such gaps. Id.

123. See supra text accompanying notes 40-48 (providing the early history of the implication
doctrine and its foundations).
124. Nelson, supra note 18, at 374.
125. Seesupratext accompanying notes 45-48 (discussing congressional limitations, including
foresight).
126. Id.
127. Comment, supra note 20, at 1393.
128. See supra text accompanying notes 68-76 (outlining cases in which the Court narrowed
the implication analysis to legislative intent).
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carried out given the contemporaneous legal context to the statute
when it was enacted." 9 Thus, the central focus of the test is on
congressional intent "with an eye toward" the four Cort
factors. 3 '
A. The Other Cort Factors
In addition to legislative intent, the factors determining
implication of a private right of action are: (1) whether the plaintiff
is one of the class for whose especial benefit the statute was
enacted; (2) whether there is any explicit or implicit legislative
intent which shows an intent to either grant or deny a remedy; and
(3) whether implication is consistent with the underlying legislative
scheme.' In Lamb v. Phillip Morris, Inc., the Sixth Circuit
found that none of these three factors were present, 32 but further
analysis of the factors indicates that the court was mistaken.
1. Especial Beneficiaries
In the opinion of the Sixth Circuit, the FCPA was created to
allow the SEC to assist federal enforcement agencies, specifically
33
the Attorney General, in curbing bribes of foreign officials.
Assuming that the SEC and Attorney General were intended to
have primary enforcement responsibilities over the FCPA does not
necessarily indicate who is the primary beneficiary of the Act.
Congress stated during committee hearings on the FCPA that
foreign bribery can effect America's domestic competitive
climate,1 34 and that such bribery "rewards corruption instead of

129. Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 698-99 (1979). The analysis is based on the
premise that Congress is assumed to be aware of relevant judicial opinions when it enacts legislation.
Id; Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 378-79 (1982). Lewis v.
Sporck, 612 F. Supp. 1316, 1327 (NJD. Cal. 1985); see supra text accompanying notes 73-80.
130. Cannon, 441 U.S. at 698-99; see Karahalios v. Nat'l Fed'n of Fed. Employees, Local
1263, 489 U.S. 527 (1989); Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979).
131. Crt v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975).
132. Lamb, 915 F.2d at 1028-30.
133. Id at 1028.
134. S.REP. No. 114, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1977).
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efficiency" at the cost of the violator's competitors.'35 The Sixth
Circuit assumed from this language that Congress designed the
FCPA to secure the integrity of American foreign policy and
domestic markets.'36 This may arguably be so, but if that is the
primary goal of the Act, competitors of the violating party are at
least secondary beneficiaries of the thereby protected domestic
markets.
In addition, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has
recognized that a statute may have more than one class of
beneficiaries. In McDaniel v. University of Chicago,13 7 the
Seventh Circuit held that especial beneficiaries does not always
mean exclusive beneficiaries.138 Acts of Congress may be passed
for a variety of purposes, and there may be one or several
beneficiaries of any statutory enactment.' 39 It is logical that
competitors of FCPA violators should be considered beneficiaries
of the Act. It also follows that as direct beneficiaries of the FCPA's
ability to protect the integrity of markets, private plaintiffs have a
strong interest in enforcement of the FCPA, a factor which would
make them excellent enforcement tools to assist the SEC.
2. Consistency with the Legislative Scheme
In Lamb, the Sixth Circuit also found that private enforcement
of the FCPA was inconsistent with the provisions of the Act
itself. " In the opinion of the court, the terms of the FCPA
indicated a preference for compliance over prosecution.' 4' Based
on this alleged preference, the court opined that congressional goals
would be hindered by private plaintiffs whose goal was post42
violation enforcement, rather than pre-violation compliance.
For foreign policy reasons, Congress may have genuinely preferred
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
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H.R. REP. No. 640, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 4-5 (1977).
Lamb, 915 F.2d at 1028-29.
548 F.2d 689 (1977).
Id at 693.
See generally idi
Lamb, 915 F.2d at 1029-30.
Id. at 1029.
Id.
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corporate reporting which would ensure compliance. However, if
Congress did not intend post-violation prosecution to play an
integral role in enforcement of the FCPA, it would not have
included provisions in the Act for severe fines and possible
imprisonment.14 Prosecution must have been at least a
consideration of Congress in enacting the FCPA. Furthermore, for
the Act to have any real effectiveness in curtailing bribery, there
must be the possibility of prosecution for those who do not comply.
While the FCPA gives the SEC and the Attorney General
discretion to bring civil or criminal actions,"4a the existence of
discretionary state enforcement does not create an inference of
exclusive enforcement by state agencies. 45 In Abrahamson v.
4 6 the Second Circuit Court of Appeals considered the
Fleschner,"
possibility of implied private rights of action under the Advisers
Act of 1940 (another SEA statute), which contained the same
discretionary prosecution language as the FCPA 47 The court in
Abrahamson found no legislative intent to restrict enforcement to
the Commission.1 48 Instead, it found that the enforcement powers
given to the SEC under the Adviser's Act were identical to those
given in other securities acts under which the courts have
recognized private rights of action. 149 The Second Circuit felt it
would be extraordinary for Congress to expect federal agencies to
prosecute in every instance, and cited SecuritiesInvestor Protection
Corp. v. Barbour"'° for the proposition that private suits under

143.

See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2 (g)(1)(A) (1988) (providing for fines not to exceed $2 million for

domestic corporations which violate the Act); § 78dd-2 (g)(2)(B) (calling for fines not to exceed
$100,000 and prison terms not to exceed five years for directors or officers who willfully violate the
Act).

144.

§ 78dd-2(d)(1).

145. See Abrahamson v. Fleschner, 568 F.2d 862 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 913
(1978).
146. Id.
147. Id. at 874 n.19. The language in the Advisers Act provides that the SEC 'may in its
discretion bring an action' for injunctive relief. Id.; cf. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(d)(1) (1988). The
language in the relevant section of the FCPA provides that the Attorney General may, in his
discretion, bring an action for injunctive relief. Id.
148. Abrahamson, 568 F.2d at 874 n.19.
149. Id.
150. 421 U.S. 412 (1975).
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the SEA should only be barred when they were a hindrance to
Commission action."' In the case of the FCPA, private
enforcement would not hinder or interfere with the SEC's or
Attorney General's enforcement responsibilities.
A similar view was expressed by the Supreme Court in Cannon
v. University of Chicago.152 In Cannon, the Court held that if the
administering agency takes the position that private remedies would
153
provide effective assistance in enforcing the statutory goals,
then a private right of action should be recognized.154 Such intent
was demonstrated by the Chairman of the SEC, who indicated at
Commission would
the time of the FCPA's enactment that the
155
enforcement.
its
in
assistance
value private
3. State Control Over the Area of Litigation
The Sixth Circuit next considered whether antibribery
legislation is an area traditionally delegated to state control. The
court's analysis of this element was faulty in that it sidestepped the
real inquiry, which is whether the right of action is one generally
within state control. The court found that the FCPA did not meet
this element due to the existence of other federal laws under which
the plaintiff could seek a remedy. 156 According to the court,
because federal antitrust legislation was applied on a global
scale, 157 the plaintiffs, even without a FCPA claim, would not be
left without any possibility of recovery. 15' The problem with this
151. See Abrahamson, 568 F.2d at 874 n.19 (citing Securities Investor Protection Group v.
Barbour, 421 U.S. 412, 423 (1975)).
152. 441 U.S. 677 (1079).
153. Id. at 707. A private remedy is considered effective if "the government itself perceives
no ... interference" with its enforcement responsibilities by private plaintiffs. Id.

154. Id.
155. Siegel, supranote 5, at 1109 (citing Unlawful CorporatePayments Act of1977: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on ConsumerProtectionand Finance of the House Comm. on Interstateand
Foreign Commerce, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 198 (1977)).
156. Id
157. See Lamb, 915 F.2d at 1030 (citing Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon
Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 704 (1962), and Matsushita Elect. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S.
574,582 n.6, for the proposition that the "Sherman Act does reach conduct outside our borders, but
only when the conduct has an effect on American commerce").
158. Id
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analysis is that the Sixth Circuit has altered the Supreme Court test
by considering availability of other remedies. In the Supreme
Court's description of the fourth factor in Cortv. Ash, there was no
mention of alternative avenues of redress. The fourth Cort factor
is merely a determination whether the right of action is within an
area traditionally controlled by the states, which would make it
inappropriate to infer a right of action based solely on federal
law. 159 Because the Sixth Circuit gave no support or precedent
for its departure from the Supreme Court rule, its analysis was
faulty, and the court should have ended its analysis after its
determination that implication would not intrude upon matters of
state concern. Had the Sixth Circuit stopped there, it would have
found that this element of implication was met. 6°
B. Legislative Intent
Even if a court is satisfied that the first three Cort factors are
met, it cannot infer a private right of action absent supporting
legislative intent. 6 ' The judiciary may infer congressional intent
from the language of the statute, the statutory structure, the
legislative history, or merely from the goals which the statute was
designed to effectuate.' 62 In its legislative intent analysis, the
Sixth Circuit failed to consider the state of the law at the time the
FCPA was enacted 63 as required by the doctrine of contemporary

159. For support in developing this particular factor of the implication test, see Cort v. Ash,
422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975) (citing Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 652 (1963), J.1. Case Co. v.
Borak, 377 U.S. 426,434 (1964), and Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388,
394-95 (1971)).
160. See Lamb, 925 F.2d at 1030 (The regulation of bribery to foreign officials could not be
characterized as a matter traditionally relegated to state control).
161. See Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979) (holding that legislative intent
subsumed the other Cort factors); see also Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 578
(1979) (holding that all four Cort factors were to be considered, but that more weight must be
accorded to legislative intent); Jacobs v. Pabst Brewing Co., 549 F. Supp. 1050, 1056 (D. De. 1982)
(holding that the central inquiry was on the intent of Congress to create a private right of action).
162. SeeThompsonv.Thompson,484U.S. 174,179 (1988); Comment, supra note 20, at 1412.
163. See Jacobs, 549 F.Supp. at 1056 (citing Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v.
Curran, 456 U.S. 353 (1982)).
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legal context.1 Because this idea is so integral to an intent
analysis, and the FCPA in particular, the bulk of this analysis will
discuss the existence of contemporaneous congressional intent to
provide a private remedy under the FCPA.
1. Rules of Statutory Construction
Since the original draft of the FCPA had express provisions for
private actions, which were later deleted, 1 a strong argument
can be made against an implied right of action. In divining
legislative intent, it is a well established rule that the removal of a
provision indicates congressional intent to exclude the specific
provision from the statute. However, given the circumstances
surrounding the enactment of the FCPA, this rule is not applicable.
The ninety-fourth Congress deleted the express private right of
action provision because the Senate Committee on Banking,
Housing and Urban Affairs believed that the language "would have
duplicated and possibly confused existing remedies available to
shareholders." ' The SEC's testimony before that Subcommittee
was the basis for this conclusion.167 By deleting the express
provision for private remedies, Congress did not intend to eliminate
such a right of action. On the contrary, the deletion by Congress
was done to ensure that such a right was available under all
applicable SEA statutes.
Probably the most important recognized rule of statutory
construction in analyzing the FCPA is that in the absence of
express statutory provision, committee reports are the most

164. See supratext accompanying notes 77-85 (describing the creation and development of the
contemporary legal context doctrine).
165. See supra notes 22-28 and accompanying text (describing reasons given by Congress for
deleting the express provision for private rights of action under the FCPA).
166. S. REP. No. 1031, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 12, 12-13 (1976). See Wade Letter, supra note
24 ("Mhe use of the word *duplicated' is a strong indication that the Committee believed it was
unnecessary expressly to provide for a private right of action on behalf of shareholders .... ").
167. See Wade Letter, supranote 24 (citing Securities and Exchange Commission, 94th Cong.,
2d Sess., Report to the Senate Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs Committee on S. 3379 (1976));
see supra notes 24-26, and accompanying text (providing the substance of the SEC report).
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persuasive source of legislative intent. 1" During the ninety-fifth
Congress (which enacted the FCPA), the Subcommittee on
Consumer Protection and Finance of the House Committee on
Interstate and Foreign Commerce stated in its report that its
members intended for the courts to recognize a private right of
action in favor of persons experiencing injury caused by prohibited
corporate bribery."
Further support for the implication of a private right of action
is gained from statements made by the SEC. According to the
Supreme Court, the views of an administrative agency are entitled
to particular weight where the administrators took part in drafting
the legislation and expressly indicated their views to Congress in
Committee hearings. 170 SEC Chairman Harold M. Williams
testified before the above mentioned Committee during the FCPA
hearings that "this legislation would furnish the Commission and
tools to employ against those
private plaintiffs... with potent new
7
who [commit corporate bribery].' '
While courts may consider comments made by congressional
committee members in a legislative intent analysis, some of these
comments are to be discounted completely or given little weight.
Before enactment of the FCPA, a Conference Committee was
created to reconcile the differences between the House and Senate
versions of the legislation. After the Committee's deliberations,

168. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30,40 (1986); Garcia v. United States, 469 U.S. 70,76
(1984); Zuber v. Allen, 396 U.S. 168, 186 (1969); Mills v. United States, 713 F.2d 1249, 1252 (7th
Cir. 1983), cert denied, 464 U.S. 1069 (1984).
169. H.R. REP. No. 640,95th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1977); see also Wade Letter, supranote 24
("IThe word 'persons' is broad enough to encompass an implied cause of action on behalf of both
shareholders and competitors of the corporation that may suffer injury as a result of prohibited
corporate bribery .... "').
170. Miller v. Youakim, 440 U.S. 125, 144 (1979); Zuber, 396 U.S. at 192; Adams v. United
States, 319 U.S. 312,314-15 (1943); United States v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, Inc., 310 U.S. 534,549
(1940); cf. Piper v. Chris Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1 (1977). The Court in Piper held that the
expertise of an administrative agency is of limited value when determining if a court should imply
a private right of action. Id. at 41 n.27. The Court, however, was focusing on the views of an
administrative agency at the time of litigation, and not on views given during the drafting of the
legislation. Id.
171. Siegel, supra note 5, at 1109 n.171 (emphasis added) (quoting Unlawful Corporate
Payments Act of 1977. HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on Consumer Protection and Financeofthe
House Comm. on Interstate and ForeignCommerce, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 198 (1977)).
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Senator John Tower and Congressman Samuel Devine, both
members of the Committee, stated expressly that the Conference
Committee did not intend for the courts to imply a remedy for
private plaintiffs.172 While on the surface these comments would
seem damning to an argument for implication, their persuasiveness
in an implication analysis is severely limited by the rules of
statutory construction. Remarks made by persons not involved with
the drafting of the bill, as well as comments by opponents of the
bill, are entitled to little weight in determining legislative
intent.'73 Actually, courts look to the sponsors of legislation when
the meaning of a statute is in doubt.174 Neither Tower nor Devine
were involved in the drafting of the FCPA. Actually, Devine joined
in a minority report expressly opposing the adopted enforcement
provisions. In addition, neither of the Conferees could persuade
their brethren to include their statements in the Committee
report. 175
The testimony and release presented by the SEC, along with the
express intent of the Subcommittee on Consumer Protection and
Finance as indicated in their report,"' should have sufficed to
show legislative intent and overcome the negative inference the
Subcommittee members knew would otherwise be created by
deleting the express provision for private actions. Therefore,
application of the rules of statutory construction indicates that
Congress intended for the FCPA to include implicit private actions.

172. See Wade Letter, supranote 24 (citing H.R. REP. No. 831,95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977)).
173. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 204 n.24 (1976) (holding that remarks
made by nondrafters of legislation during congressional debate is entitled to little weight); see also
Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270, 288 (1956) (Legislators with minority views should
not be allowed to effectively amend a bill by putting words in the mouths of the majority).
174. NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers & Warehousemen, 377 U.S. 58, 66 (1964).
175. Wade Letter, supra note 24. Actually, Tower later stated that the question of implication
was never considered by the Conference Committee. Id.
176. See supra notes 34, 36-37 and accompanying text (providing the substance of the
Committee Report, the SEC Chairman's testimony, and the SEC release).

556

1992 / Lamb v. Phillip Morris, Inc.
2. ContemporaneousLegal Context
It is no secret that the federal courts today are much less likely
than in previous years to infer a private right of action from a
statute.177 The Supreme Court has held, however, that an analysis
of legislative intent must be carried out in the legal context
contemporary with the enactment of the statute. 178 This doctrine
is founded on the assumption that Congress is aware of relevant
judicial opinions when it enacts legislation. 179 Given this legal
doctrine, the Sixth Circuit should have looked beyond the current
attitude toward implication to the stance the courts took toward the
doctrine at the time of the ninety-fifth Congress.18
To determine the law governing the implication doctrine in
1977, one would certainly have to look to the contemporaneous
case law, but the amount of case law pertaining to implication and
contemporaneous with the enactment of the FCPA would probably
require another comment to effectively analyze. An illustration of
the contemporaneous judicial attitude toward implication is given
in a statement made by one commentator in 1975: "[T]he existence
of the [implication] doctrine is so widely accepted that its
underlying justification is rarely discussed." ' From a statement
like this, one can infer that in 1977 the judicial attitude toward
implication was at the very least more liberal than it is today, and
at most equally favorable as in 1975.
While a broad overview of all applicable case law is beyond
the scope of this comment, an examination of case law pertaining

177. Jacobs, 549 F. Supp. at 1058; see supra note 121 and accompanying text (outlining the
trend away from implication as seen in Supreme Court cases).
178. Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677,698-99 (1979); Lewis v. Sporck, 612 F. Supp.
1316, 1327 (N.D. Cal. 1985).
179. Cannon, 441 U.S. at 696-97; see Lewis, 612 F. Supp. at 1327.
180. Cf Jacobs,549 F. Supp. 1050. The court in Jacobs cites Piper v. Chris Craft Industries,
Inc., 430 U.S. 1,31-32 (1977), for the proposition that the contemporary legal context analysis does
not include a determination of whether the courts were more likely to imply a right of action, and
that the 'legal context' can be considered only if there is some judicial interpretation of the specific
statutory question at issue. Id. The Court in Piper did not, however, make any such assertion, but
rather held that a finding of implication with respect to one plaintiff does not lead to implication for
a second plaintiff not similarly situated. See generally Piper,430 U.S. 1 (1977).
181. Comment, supra note 20, at 1393; Jacobs, 549 F. Supp. at 1058.
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to the contemporary judicial attitude towards implication under
SEA statutes is possible. Considerable case law indicates a positive
judicial attitude toward implication under the provisions of the
Securities Exchange Act (of which the FCPA is a part) at the time
the FCPA was enacted."l This was due to the inability of the
SEC to effectively enforce all of the provisions which came under
its regulatory jurisdiction."8 3 Actually, two years before the
enactment of the FCPA, the Supreme Court held that it would be
unrealistic for Congress to expect federal agencies to prosecute
every violation within their jurisdiction.'" The Court also stated
that any such expectation for the SEC in particular would be even
less realistic, and that private suits under the SEA should be barred
only when they are a hindrance to Commission action. Because of
the SEC's ineffectiveness in enforcement of SEA provisions,
federal courts by 1977 had inferred private rights of action under
several SEA provisions.185 This fact was conveyed to Congress
by then SEC Chairman Harold Williams through the SEC report
circulated to the various congressional committees.186 Therefore,

182. See Moses v. Burgin, 445 F.2d 369 (1st Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 994 (1971);
Herpich v. Wallace, 430 F.2d 792,815 (5th Cir. 1970); Esplin v. Hirschi, 402 F.2d 94, 103 (10th Cir.
1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 928 (1969) (recognizing an implied private right of action under the
Investment Companies Act); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 730 (1975);
Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9; Fischman v. Raytheon
Mfg. Co., 188 F.2d 783, 787 (2d Cir. 1951); Kardon v. Nat'l Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (F.D.
Pa. 1946) (finding implied private rights of action under Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act and Rule lOb5); see also J.L Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964) (finding an implied private right of action
under Section 14(a) of the 1934 Act); Goldstein v. Groesbeck, 142 F.2d 422 (2d Cir. 1944), cert.
denied, 323 U.S. 737 (1944) (finding an implied right of action under the Public Utility Holding
Company Act); Daniel v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 561 F.2d 1223 (7th Cir. 1977); Local 734 Trust
v. Continental Ill.
Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., Fed. Sec. L Rep. (CCH) 194565,95963 (N.D. Ill. 1974)
(finding an implied private right of action under section 17(a) of the 1933 Act).
183. Abrahamson v. Fleschner, 568 F.2d 862, 874 (2d Cir. 1976); see Nelson, supra note 18,
at 371 (citing J.L Case Co. v. Borak in which the SEC admitted that it was unable to adequately
examine all complaints due to staff limitations).
184. Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Barbour, 421 U.S. 412, 423 (1975).
185. See supra note 182.
186. See Unlawful Corporate Payments Act of 1977: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
ConsumerProtection andFinanceof the House Comm. on InterstateandForeign Commerce, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. 196-211 (1977). After the report given by Mr. Williams, the House Report on House
Bill 3815 included the following: "'he
recognition of such a private cause [of action] would ...
provide a necessarysupplement to the enforcement efforts of the [Securities Exchange] Commission
and the Department of Justice." Siegel, supra note 5, at 1110 (emphasis added) (quoting H.R. REP.
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in enacting and amending the FCPA, Congress knew of the
difficulties the SEC would face in single-handedly enforcing the
FCPA provisions,"' and the possible negative effect an express
right of recovery could have had on previously implied private
rights of action under the SEA. Had these considerations not been
part of the contemporary legal context in 1977, it is likely that
Congress would have left an express provision for private rights of
action in the FCPA.
V. CONCLUSION

There can be no doubt that if Congress wants to include a
private right of action within the provisions of a statute they
certainly know how to do so. However, this ability does not
preclude the possibility that Congress intended a private right, even
in the absence of an express provision. "Beyond the political
realities which will at times compel congressional by-passing of
any issue-thus leaving it open until pending litigation forces court
resolution-lie such simpler pressures as shortness of time and,
perhaps most important, the severe limits of human foresight." '88
The limitations alluded to in this quote will often result in
ineffective legislation.189 The implication doctrine was created to
prevent these limitations from frustrating congressional goals. 9 '
Although these limitations still exist, the courts today are less
likely to imply a private right of action. Determining whether or
not this trend is a positive one has not been the goal of this
comment, but rather to determine whether such implication was
warranted under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.

No. 640, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1977)).
187.

See Abrahamson, 568 F.2d at 874 (stating that in 1977 "courts consistently have

recognized that the [SECs] resources are inadequate to the task of policing alone the federal
securities laws-); see also Wyandotte Transp. Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 191, 204 (1967)
(holding that inadequacy of enforcement is a particularly important reason to imply a private right
of action lest the wrongdoer be able to shift the burden of his violation onto the innocent plaintiff).
188. Mishldn, supra note 44, at 800.
189. See Nelson, supra note 18, at 374.
190. rL
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The case law on implication indicates that there is a four
element test, which was set forth in Cort v. Ash. However, cases
subsequent to Cort have held that the focus of any implication
analysis must be on legislative intent. Prior case law has also held
that the legislative intent must be measured at the time the statute
was enacted. When the FCPA was enacted, federal courts were still
liberally applying the implication doctrine. As late as 1977, courts
were still citing as precedent the implication language of J.I. Case
Co. v. Borak, which held that "[i t is the duty of the courts to be
alert to provide such remedies as are necessary to make effective
the congressional purpose."' 91 It was under this more liberal
implication standard which Congress enacted the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act, and it is under this standard that today's courts
should determine if a private right of action should be implied.
Finally, the Sixth Circuit's decision not to imply a private right of
action creates a strong sense of irony when one considers that the
express provision for private remedy was taken out of the enacted
version of the FCPA to protect the private remedies under other
SEA statutes, and out of a feeling that such provision was not
necessary for the right to exist. Given these considerations, it
appears that the Sixth Circuit handed down an incorrect decision in
Lamb v. Phillip Morris, Inc. when they chose not to infer such a
private right.
Brett Witter
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